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OIL AND GAS-LIMITATIONS ON THE APPLI-
CATION OF THE DUHIG RULE OF CON-
STRUCTION-Florida Gas Exploration Company v.
Searcy, 385 So. 2d 1293 (Miss. 1980), affg Searcy v. Tomlinson
Interests, Inc., 358 So. 2d 373 (Miss. 1978).
In 1952, W. C. McLeod executed a warranty deed convey-
ing eighty acres of land to Vester Thompson upon the under-
standing that McLeod was reserving unto himself an undi-
vided one-fourth of the minerals in the deed. McLeod had ac-
quired the land subject to a one-half mineral reservation by
prior owners. The agreement with the grantee was to divide
equally the remaining one-half mineral interest. Accordingly,
the warranty deed was worded to contain the following min-
eral reservation: "one-fourth interest in all minerals and oil
is reserved to the grantor." Due to an oversight in drafting,
the deed made no mention of the one-half minerals outstand-
ing in prior owners.'
In 1957, a deed of trust executed by Thompson was re-
corded. It recited that it was subject to a reservation by W.
C. McLeod of one-fourth of all minerals, a reservation by the
Federal Land Bank of one-half of all minerals, and a reserva-
tion by the J. J. Newman Lumber Company of one-eighth of
all minerals in the northeast quarter of the northeast quar-
ter.' Thereafter, in May of 1957, Thompson leased to one Ban-
ahan a one-half mineral interest in the eighty acre tract for
a term of ten years. During the course of this transaction,
Thompson initially indicated to Banahan that he owned no
more than one-fourth of the minerals. To be sure, Banahan
agreed to recheck the records to verify his opinion that
Thompson had title to one-half of the minerals. Apparently
satisfied with Banahan's second evaluation, Thompson ex-
ecuted the lease purportedly covering a one-half mineral in-
terest. Until the trial, the details of this conversation with
Banahan were unknown to the appellants.3 Hearing of this,
1. Florida Gas Expl. Co. v. Searcy, 385 So. 2d 1293 (Miss. 1980), affg Searcy v.
Tomlinson Ints., Inc., 358 So. 2d 373 (Miss. 1978).
2. 385 So. 2d at 1294.
3. Brief in support of petition for rehearing at 10, Florida Gas Expl. Co. v.
Searcy, 385 So. 2d 1293 (Miss. 1980).
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the McLeod heirs approached Thompson to ask why they had
not been contacted about leasing. Thompson explained what
he had been told by Banahan. No further action was taken by
the McLeod heirs.
After fourteen years had passed, Thompson executed an-
other lease, dating from 1971, which by ratification, purport-
ed to cover a one-half mineral interest in the eighty acres.
Tomlinson, Florida Gas and others were assigned this lease
and thereby claimed a leasehold interest in one-half of the
minerals underlying the eighty acre tract. Subsequently, J. C.
Searcy obtained an instrument from Thompson, executed in
1974 for $6,000.00 consideration, which purportedly recog-
nized a mutual mistake in the 1952 warranty deed and con-
veyed a one-fourth mineral interest back to the McLeod
heirs. The Searcy parties later acquired all interests of the
McLeod heirs and sued to reform the 1952 deed to reflect ac-
curately a one-fourth mineral reservation in the grantor. The
bill of complaint also prayed for removal of the defendant's
lease as to one-fourth of the minerals as a cloud on the com-
plainant's title.'
The chancery court sustained demurrers based upon the
ten year statutes of limitation applicable to reformation
suits. 5 Appeal was taken to the supreme court where the
chancellor was reversed, the demurrers overruled, and the
case remanded for a hearing on the merits. This being the
first of two appeals of the case,' the supreme court found
4. Searcy v. Tomlinson Ints., Inc., 358 So. 2d 373 (Miss. 1978), Gffd sub nom,
Florida Gas Expl. Co. v. Searcy, 385 So. 2d 1293 (Miss. 1980). The appellees, J. C.
Searcy, Jr., Searcy Enterprises and Montego Petroleum filed an action against Tom-
linson Interests, Inc., Watson Oil Corp., Florida Gas Exploration Co. and First Mis-
sissippi Corp. On the second appeal to the supreme court, Florida Gas replaced Tom-
linson Interests as a party opponent.
5. MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-7 (1972). The pertinent provisions are:
A person many not make an entry or commence an action to recover
land except within ten years next after the time at which the right to
make the entry or to bring the action shall have first accrued to some
person through whom he claims, or if the right shall not have accrued
to any person after the time at which the right to make the entry or
bring the action shall have first accrued to the person making or bring-
ing the same.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-9 (1972). The pertinent provisions are:
A person claiming land in equity may not bring suit to recover the
same except within the period during which, by virtue of section 15-1-7,
he might have made an entry or brought an action to recover the same,
if he had been entitled at law to such an estate, interest, or right in or
to the same as he shall claim therein in equity.
6. Searcy v. Tomlinson Ints., Inc., 358 So. 2d 373 (Miss. 1978).
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that in cases of mutual mistake, where the grantor does not
intend to own or claim the interest in question, there is no
actual or constructive possession. Without possession, the
limitation period had not begun to run against reformation.'
In the hearing on remand, the defendants claimed as bona
fide purchasers without notice of the alleged mutual mistake.
The chancellor held the defendants took with notice and en-
tered judgment for the plaintiff removing the defendant's
lease as to one-fourth minerals as a cloud on the plaintiff's
title. A second appeal was taken and the supreme court af-
firmed the chancellor's holding.8 Throughout the trial and on
appeal, a pivotal issue in the case was the effect of notice
given by the recitals in Thompson's deed of trust. The su-
preme court found the recitals to the effect that McLeod re-
served a one-fourth mineral interest imposed a duty of inqui-
ry on the purchasers.' Under the prevailing case law, this
duty of inquiry imputes notice of all facts it would have re-
vealed, whether actually undertaken or not.10
The appellants had argued before the supreme court
that the deed of trust was not notice of the alleged mistake
because it was not within their chain of title, nor an essential
link therein.11 It has long been an established rule in Missis-
sippi that a grantor who reserves minerals in a warranty
deed must also except any prior reservations or severances in
order to give full viability to his own reservation. This is held
7. Id. at 375. In an opinion by Commissioner Bizzell, sitting pursuant to 1976
MISS. LAWS, ch. 430, the court distinguished the present case from the holding of
Neal v. Teat, 240 Miss. 35, 126 So. 2d 124 (1961). Neal held that when minerals are
severed by conveyance, constructive possession is annexed to passage of title. A void
instrument carries no title and thus no constructive possession. A voidable instru-
ment, however, starts the statute to run upon recording. Id. at 43, 126 So. 2d at 127.
For a critical analysis of the limitation statutes as applied to cases of mutual mis-
take, see Malone & Keesee, The Reformation Qf Writings under the Law qf Mississip-
pi, 8 MISS. LJ. 329, 346 (1936). For a recent affirmance of the Neal doctrine, see
Dent v. Calhoun, 326 So. 2d 320 (Miss. 1975).
8. Florida Gas Expl. Co. v. Searcy, 385 So. 2d 1293 (Miss. 1980), qfg Searcy v.
Tomlinson Into., Inc., 358 So. 2d 373 (Miss. 1978).
9. Id. at 1297. The court also held that it would not reopen the statutes of limi-
tations issue, citing as its authority the doctrine of "the law of the case" as stated in
Mississippi College v. May, 241 Miss. 359, 128 So. 2d 557 (1961). The court further
held invalid the appellant's contention that the contested one-fourth mineral inter-
est had been acquired by adverse possession, citing as authority McCaughn v.
Young, 85 Miss. 277, 37 So. 839 (1904).
10. 385 So. 2d at 1297.
11. Id. at 1295.
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to apply however specific the wording of the grantor's reser-
vation may be. The rule mandates that the grantor must
first satisfy the interest purportedly conveyed to the grantee
before claiming to have retained an interest for himself. This
concept, originally borrowed from the seminal Texas decision
Duhig v. Peavey-Moore Lumber Co.,lla is popularly known as
the Duhig rule of construction. The rule has great utility to
title examiners in that title may be ascertained from the re-
cords alone. By applying the rule to construe the mineral res-
ervation, it becomes unnecessary to interview the parties for
the purpose of determining their intent.
The unstated issue underlying the Florida Gas decision
was whether the Duhig rule would apply at all when there
are recorded collateral instruments that contain recitals in-
dicative of mutual mistake. Whether intentional or not, the
supreme court's ruling holds that the Duhig rule would not
apply under these circumstances. How deep an inroad the
mutual mistake doctrine will make on the Duhig rule re-
mains to be seen by future cases.
A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF THE DUHIG RULE
Whenever the grantor in a warranty deed reserves min-
erals to himself but fails to recite those reservations or sev-
erances by prior owners, a basic construction problem arises.
The problem is to determine for whose benefit the singular
reservation is to operate. Stated differently, what interest is
to be protected: the grantor's intent to reserve for himself, or
the grantee's expectations created by the warranty of title?
The rule is uniformly applied to initially make the grantor's
reservation operative only to remove the prior sev-
erances from the grant. 2 As a tool of construction, the rule
applies when contradiction exists between the granting and
reservation clauses in warranty deeds and other instruments
bearing covenants of title.13 To illustrate, assume that A,
owning the surface and all minerals, has reserved one-half
minerals in a conveyance to B. Then the latter conveys and
warrants to C with a reservation: "the grantor reserves unto
11a. 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940).
12. See generally Barber, Duhig to Date Problems in the Conveyancing of Frac-
tional Mineral Interests, 13 SW. L.J. 320 (1959). The rule originated in Duhig v. Pea-
vey-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940).
13. See generally 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 311 (1981).
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himself one-half of all minerals." The prior reservation has
been omitted. Viewing the deed from the grantee's perspec-
tive, it apparently delivers title in fee simple subject only to
removal of one-half minerals from the grant. Meaning, in es-
sence, the grantee has obtained the surface and one-half the
minerals. On the other hand, the grantor believes that he has
reserved by express language one-half of the minerals to
himself. Both parties thus claim the same interest since the
prior reservation of A cannot be affected by the subsequent
actions of B and C. The basic issue is whether the intent of
the grantor should be recognized in spite of his breaching a
warranty obligation to the grantee.
If a position is adopted favoring the grantor, the grantee
takes the surface and accures a cause of action against the
grantor for breach of the warranty of title covenant.14 In the
alternative, the deed may be construed to convey all that it
does not properly except."5 This latter construction favoring
the grantee was adopted in Duhig v. Peavey-Moore Lumber
Company16
Factually, the Duhig decision involved an omission of a
prior owner's reservation of one-half minerals from the
grantor's deed. The deed was otherwise very specific in re-
serving one-half minerals to the grantor. 7 The Texas Su-
preme Court had differing opinions of the correct theory to
apply, but nonetheless unanimous in holding the grant-
or retained no interest under the deed. i" Commissioner Smed-
ley, who wrote for the majority, perceived the problem as one
of pure construction. The deed warranted the fee simple title,
reserved one-half the minerals, and, therefore, conveyed the
surface and one-half the minerals. 9 Although this approach
was explained as ascertaining the intent of the parties, in ef-
14. See Meredith v. Pratt, 208 Miss. 412, 44 So. 2d 521 (1950). Where breach of
warranty results, the measure of damages is the difference in the value of the land
without the warranted interest. Id at 421, 44 So. 2d at 521. See also Sutton v. Can-
non, 136 Miss. 368, 100 So. 24 (1924).
15. Garraway v. Bryant, 224 Miss. 459, 80 So. 2d 59 (1955).
16. 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940).
17. Id. at 506, 144 S.W.2d at 879. The reservation clause stated that "it is ex-
pressly agreed and stipulated that the grantor herein retains an undivided one-half
interest in and to all mineral rights of minerals of whatever description in the
land." Id. (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 506-07, 144 S.W.2d at 879-80.
19. Id. at 507, 144 S.W.2d at 879.
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fect it gives little consideration to what the actual intent of
the parties might have been. The remainder of the majority
admittedly recognized the grantor's intention to reserve for
itself but applied the doctrine of estoppel by deed as an alter-
native rationale to pure construction.20 The estoppel theory
forbids the assertion of title in contradition to the warranty.
If the instrument purports to convey the surface and one-
half the minerals, but the grantor claims the reserved inter-
est, there is an immediate breach of warranty as to the one-
half minerals warranted. Therefore, the grantor should not
be allowed to retain the very thing needed to make the gran-
tee whole while leaving the latter to sue for breach of war-
ranty.21 It follows that the court will redress the breach of
warranty by donating the "retained" interest to the grantee.
If a residue of interest remains after satisfying the warranty
obligation to grantee, the grantor may retain for itself. The
primary obligation, however, is to deliver in quantum what
the grantor has warranted would be conveyed to the grantee.
This approach then amounts to a short-hand method of re-
dress which regards the warranty suit as an inappropriate
remedy. Another interesting, yet confusing, facet of this deci-
sion is the court's analogy of the estoppel theory to the doc-
trine of after-acquired title. In this connection, it was rea-
soned that the estoppel arises out of an assertion of after-
acquired title.2 As a general rule, estoppel applies when the
grantor warrants a particular estate and sometime thereafter
asserts a claim pertaining to what has been warranted. Tech-
nically speaking, the grantor in Duhig was not asserting an
after-acquired title because the attempt was to presently re-
tain. The majority judges who espoused the estoppel theory
regarded as unmeaningful the distinction between claiming
the interest now, or claiming it later. In either case the as-
sertion is inimical and contradictory to the grantee's inter-
est.23 It is doubtful that the analogy to the doctrine of after-
acquired title has been beneficial in stabilizing a rationale
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for the Duhig rule.2' Realistically, the grantor in a Duhig sit-
uation is not asserting a title actually acquired after the con-
veyance. The proponents of estoppel understood this to be the
case, but felt the remedy performed by the after-acquired ti-
tle doctrine was mutually expedient in either instance. 5 Per-
haps what the Duhig rule in principle best expresses is a ba-
sic foundational rule of conveyancing: "[a] conveyance of the
land, without more, passes title to both [the minerals and the
surface]."26
There is by now little doubt that Duhig is the prevailing
rule in Mississippi. In a recent decision postdating the Flor-
ida Gas decision, the supreme court stated in dictum:
If a grantor conveys and warrants land but excepts or reserves one-
half the minerals, at a time when one-half the minerals are out-
standing in a third party, he is held to have conveyed the whole sur-
face and one-half the minerals. Since one-half the minerals was all
he had to convey, the grantor is left with no interest, the rationale
being that the grantor's warranty obligation to convey half the min-
erals is superior to his reservation rights.7
Though the rule itself has a sound case lineage in Mis-
sissippi, the rationale behind it lacks similar consistency.28
24. For a discussion of the theoretical variations of the Duhig rule as a result of
the estoppel theory, see R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.2 at 94
(1971). It appears that the after-acquired title analogy has become so associated
with the rule that it has lost its distinction as merely an analogy. See Rosenbaum v.
McCaskey, 386 So. 2d 387, 390 (Miss. 1980).
25. 135 Tex. at 507, 144 S.W.2d at 880.
26. Ewing, Reservation and Exception of Minerals in Mississippi Conveyancing,
39 Miss. L.J. 39 (1967). For cases holding that a conveyance of "the land," without
further description passes title to both the minerals and surface, see Whelan v.
Johnston, 192 Miss. 673, 6 So. 2d 300 (1942).
27. Rosenbaum v. McCaskey, 386 So. 2d 387, 388-89 (Miss. 1980). The supreme
court in Rosenbaum was faced with construing a quitclaim deed which purported to
reserve minerals to the grantor without mentioning a prior mineral reservation. Al-
though Rosenbaum lacks the expansive fact pattern of the Forida Gas case, it is
otherwise noteworthy that the court in Rosenbaum stated that 'Ih]ad this instru-
ment been a warranty deed, there is no question that Rosenbaum would have re-
tained no interest, notwithstanding the recital in the deed that he was to retain a
half interest in the minerals." Id. at 388.
28. Compare Garraway v. Bryant, 224 Miss. 459, 80 So. 2d 59 (1955) (using the
pure construction rationale that the reservation merely removed the prior interest
from the grant because the deed conveyed all that it did not exclude) and Brannon v.
Varnado, 234 Miss. 466, 106 So. 2d 386 (1958) (applying the breach of warranty the-
ory holding warranty obligations superior to reservation rights) with Lucas v.
Thompson, 240 Miss. 767, 128 So. 2d 874 (1961); Salmen Brick & Lumber Co. v. Wil-
liams, 210 Miss. 560, 573, 50 So. 2d 130, 135 (1951) (Alexander, J., dissenting); Father-
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The rule has been held to apply in the absence of warranty
by judicial expansion of the estoppel theory based upon the
after-acquiring title doctrine.29 As a practical matter, the Du-
hig rule merely allocates the burden of correcting an error to
the party primarily responsible for it, regardless of the the-
ory employed.
EFFECT OF MUTUAL MISTAKE
As human nature would accurately predict, only in rare
cases does a grantee renounce a claim to the mistakenly con-
veyed mineral interest. This is especially so when, as in many
cases, the error is not uncovered until an oil or gas discovery
is made. Indeed, if the grantee does renounce the interest, it
is unlikely the case would ever reach court or become a re-
ported decision. Suffice to say that cases on the factual order
of Florida Gas are both scarce and narrow in principle. How-
ever, Mississippi is not completely without precedent in this
regard.
The case in point is Smalley v. Rogers,0 a 1958 decision
that upheld the reformation of a warranty deed containing
the typical reservation flaw found in cases applying the Du-
hig rule.31 The facts showed that Rogers conveyed by warran-
ty deed to Hudson and reserved a one-fourth mineral inter-
est; a prior severance of one-half the minerals went unmen-
tioned in the deed. Hudson then conveyed portions of the
land by separate warranty deeds to H. W. Smalley and J. D.
Smalley. The Hudson deeds recited: "this conveyance is made
subject only to such prior reservations of minerals as were
reserved by former grantors, it being the intention of the
grantor herein to convey any and all mineral interests owned
by him under the above described land." 2 Rogers later
sought reformation of his warranty deed to Hudson, assert-
ree v. McCormick, 199 Miss. 248, 253, 24 So. 2d 724, 725 (1946) (Griffith, J., dissent-
ing); Richardson v. Moore, 198 Miss. 741, 22 So. 2d 494 (1945). In addition to Missis-
sippi, the rule is controlling in Colorado, North Dakota, Wyoming, Texas and Okla-
homa. See 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 311 at 578.26 (1981).
29. See Merchants & Mfrs. Bank v. Dennis, 229 Miss. 447, 91 So. 2d 254 (1956).
But see Rosenbaum v. McCaskey, 386 So. 2d 387 (Miss. 1980).
30. 232 Miss. 705, 100 So. 2d 118 (1958).
31. 1& at 708, 100 So. 2d at 119. But see 5 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND
GAS § 996 (1966) (criticizing the decision as "harsh [and] difficult to justify").
32. 232 Miss. at 705, 100 So. 2d at 119.
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ing that due to mutual mistake the deed failed to reflect ac-
curately the grantor's reservation of one-fourth the minerals.
The Smalleys claimed one-half the minerals as bona fide pur-
chasers without notice.33 In affirming the chancellor, the su-
preme court ruled that the purchasers took with notice. The
court found that a duty of inquiry arose both from the pre-
sale negotiations and the written recitals in the Hudson
deeds.3 ' Prior to the sale, Hudson had discussed with the
grantee the minerals being conveyed. There was some ques-
tion of what, if anything, Rogers had retained.35 However, for
present purposes the important part of the Smalley case
deals with the idea of imputing notice by way of recital to an
ineffective deed reservation. Without regard to the fact that
Rogers' reservation was ineffective under the Duhig rule and
merely operated to remove from the grant one-fourth of the
one-half minerals previously reserved, the purchasers were
held to have constructive notice of the mistake. It is difficult
to ascertain from the Smalley case whether the verbal or the
written notice weighed more heavily in the court's decision.
The Duhig rule was not directly included in any of the court's
discussion of the case, although seven years earlier it had
been expressly adopted in Salmen Brick & Lumber Co. v. Wil-
liams.36 It is clear that Smalley holds that basic equitable
principles deny the bona fide purchaser defense when there
is reason to suspect an infirmity in the title but failure to
investigate it. This proposition comes from both general
principles of notice by matters outside the records,37 and the
rule on constructive notice through record recitals as es-
poused in Dead River Fishing & Hunting Club v. StovaU31 The
33. Id. at 706, 100 So. 2d at 120. The majority rule adopted in Mississippi holds
that reformation, as the proper remedy for mutual mistake, is not enforceable as
against bona fide purchasers for value without constructive or actual notice. As it is
sometimes phrased, bona fide purchasers "cut off" the equity of reformation. For
further discussion, see 1 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND
GAS § 13.6 (1962). For cases applying the rule, see Adams v. Hill, 208 Miss. 341, 44
So. 2d 457 (1950); Russell v. Scarborough, 155 Miss. 508, 124 So. 648 (1929).
34. 232 Miss. 705, 713, 100 So. 2d 118, 121 (1958) (quoting the rule on construc-
tive notice by recorded instruments as stated in Dead River Fishing & Hunting Club
v. Stovall, 147 Miss. 385, 113 So. 336 (1927)).
35. 232 Miss. 705, 708, 100 So. 2d 118, 121 (1958).
36. 210 Miss. 560, 573, 50 So. 2d 130, 135 (1951) (Alexander, J., dissenting).
37. See, ag., Adams v. Hill, 208 Miss. 341, 44 So. 2d 457 (1950).
38. 147 Miss. 385, 113 So. 336 (1927).
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Smalley decision may have been based more on broad equita-
ble rules of notice than an anomalous twist of the Duhig rule.
A decision rendered by the same chancellor just months
after Smalley supports this interpretation.
In Brannon v. Varnado39 the grantor's warranty deed
omitted the prior owner's reservation, just as the Rogers
deed had in Smalley. The lower court was affirmed in apply-
ing the Duhig rule, thus preventing the grantor from retain-
ing minerals unto itself.40
The Smalley and Brannon cases are not easily distin-
guished. There are, however, some conspicuous differences.
In Brannon, the action was to confirm title, not to reform the
deed. Consequently, mutual mistake was not in issue. Possi-
bly the most important difference was the verbal notice pre-
sent in Smalley and absent in Brannon. It is questionable
whether the court would have ignored the Duhig rule in
Smalley on the force of a blanket reservation alone. It is
probably safe to assume that the cumulative effect of verbal
and written notice produced an atypical outcome in Smalley
v. Rogers. Brannon, on the other hand, parallels the classic
Duhig - type case. It would seem that the sole basis for de-
parting from the Duhig rule is determined by the degree of
notice, actual or constructive, imputable to the purchaser.
Within the context of the present case, the question arising
is whether the deed of trust recitals alone would be sufficient
to invoke a duty of inquiry enabling the court to depart from
the Duhig rule. To answer this question, it is necessary to
examine the scope of the duty of inquiry imposed on the pur-
chaser under the constructive notice rule in Mississippi.
THE SCOPE OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE RULE IN
MISSISSIPPI
Constructive notice imparted to purchasers through re-
citals of recorded instruments was the subject of the su-
39. Brannon v. Varnado, 234 Miss. 466, 106 So. 2d 386 (1958).
40. In the Brannon and Sma&i cases the grantor owned one-half minerals and
the surface and conveyed by warranty deed reserving one-fourth minerals, without
mention of a prior one-half mineral severance. The factors distinguishing SmaU/ey
from the Brannon decision seem to be that the former case alleged mutual mistake
and sought reformation as a remedy. In contrast, Brannon involved an action to
confirm the grantor's title to the disputed interest without alleging mutual mistake.
[Vol. 2:265
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preme court's ruling in Dead River Fishing & Hunting Club v.
Stoval4 1 The rule set forth in this case has been repeatedly
affirmed.4 2 In substance, it imposes a two-part obligation on
the purchaser to examine not only all deeds and conveyances
within the chain of title,"' but also all deeds and conveyances
previously executed and recorded by the purchaser's grantor
"if such deed or conveyance in any way affects his title.""
Furthermore, a conveyance within the chain of title, or one
previously executed by the purchaser's grantor, either of
which contains a recital sufficient to raise an inquiry in the
mind of a reasonably prudent man, will charge the purchaser
with all facts a diligent inquiry would reveal. 5
Since the Brannon court was faced only with a problem of construction, it applied
the Duhig rule as adopted in Salmen Brick & Lumber Co. v. Williams, 210 Miss. 560,
50 So. 2d 130 (1951).
41. 147 Miss. 385, 113 So. 336 (1927). The court stated
A purchaser of land is charged with notice not only of every state-
ment of fact made in the various conveyances constituting his chain of
title, but he is also bound to take notice of and fully explore and inves-
tigate all facts to which his attention may be directed by recitals in
said conveyance contained. The duty is also imposed on him to examine
all deeds and conveyances previously executed and placed of record by
his grantor - either immediately or remote - if such deeds or convey-
ances in any way affect his title. And if in any such deed or conveyance
there is contained any recital sufficient to put a reasonably prudent
man on inquiry as to the sufficiency of the title, then he is charged
with notice of all those facts which could and would be disclosed by a
diligent and careful investigation. Id. at 395-96, 113 So. at 337-38.
42. See, e.g., Burkett v. Peoples Bank of Biloxi, 225 Miss. 291, 83 So. 2d 185,
modified, 225 Miss. 302, 83 So. 2d 763 (1955); Adams v. Hill, 208 Miss. 341, 44 So. 2d
457 (1950).
43. What constitutes the chain of title has been said to vary with the jurisdic-
tion according to the adopted indexing procedures. As a general rule, the purchas-
er's search is bounded by the time frame within which the grantor acquired the
property and thereafter parted with title. For further discussion see 4 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.19 (A. Casner ed. 1974). The chain of title was generally
defined as "constituted by conveyances made by successive holders of the record
title but made by them while respective holders thereof" in Ryczkowski v. Chelsea
Title & Guar. Co., 85 Nev. 37, 39 n.1, 449 P.2d 261, 262 n.1 (1969) (citing Philbrick,
Limits of Record Search and Therefore Notice, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 178 (1944)).
For cases on the chain of title concept in Mississippi, See Jenkins v. Bates, 230 Miss.
406, 92 So. 2d 655 (1957); Turner v. Bell, 143 Miss. 782, 109 So. 794 (1926); Woods v.
Garnett, 72 Miss. 78, 16 So. 390 (1890); Deason v. Taylor, 53 Miss. 597 (1876); Harper
v. Bibb, 34 Miss. 472 (1857) (holding a purchaser had notice of prior liens executed
only by those through whom he deraigned title).
44. 147 Miss. 385, 395-96, 113 So. 336, 338. Because an instrument may not "af-
fect [the] title" until it has been discovered, this secondary obligation under the rule
is apparently superfluous to the definable perimeters of the duty to search. For
elaboration, see Comment, Title Searchea The Potential for Liability, 49 MISS. LJ.
689, 720 (1978).
45. 147 Miss. 385, 396, 113 So. 336, 338. A search of the tract index alone will not
suffice to satisfy the purchaser's legal obligations to conduct a record inspection
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Many of the cases containing constructive notice issues
involve instruments bearing erroneous descriptions."6 The
earlier cases were divided on the issue of when an instru-
ment with a defective description would render an inquiry
necessary.'7 One view held for no inquiry at all in certain cir-
cumstances. This was espoused in Simmons v. Hutchinson,"'
where the court stated that "[c]onstructive notice.. .is imput-
ed to purchasers and creditors from a mere presumption of
law, and it imputes only such knowledge as the instrument
there recorded discloses, and not what a diligent inquiry
might disclose."' 9 This statement, hardly to be taken as dic-
tum, engendered a later inquiry into whether a recorded in-
strument was notice only of its immediate contents. The op-
portunity to test the no-inquiry rule of Simmons came to the
supreme court in Burkett v. Peoples Bank of BiloXi. 5° The re-
sult solidified the rule that recitals provoking inquiry impart
constructive notice.51 It also clarified the fact that erroneous
descriptions do not necessarily nullify an instrument's notice
potential. The court made an explicit statement of its hold-
ing:
We hold that the record of a deed of trust is sufficient to charge
because, under the statutes in Mississippi, the general indices are the officially
maintained record compilations, MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-5-25 (1972).
46. See Sun Oil Co. v. Broadhead, 323 So. 2d 95 (Miss. 1975); Sunnybrook Chil-
dren's Home v. Dahlem, 265 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1972); Burkett v. Peoples Bank of Bi-
loxi, 225 Miss. 291, 83 So. 2d 185, modified, 225 Miss. 302, 83 So. 2d 763 (1955); Adams
v. Hill, 208 Miss. 341, 44 So. 2d 457 (1950).
47. Compare Nugent v. Priesbatch, 61 Miss. 402 (1883); Simmons v. Hutchinson,
81 Miss. 351, 33 So. 21 (1902); Sack v. Gilmer Dry Goods, 149 Miss. 296, 115 So. 339
(1929); Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Crymes, 169 Miss. 701, 153 So. 803 (1934) with
Dead River Fishing & Hunting Club v. Stovall, 147 Miss. 385, 113 So. 336 (1927). For
a discussion aimed at harmonizing these cases see 225 Miss. 291, 301, 83 So. 2d 185,
189 (Gillespie, J., special opinion).
48. 81 Miss. 351, 33 So. 21 (1902). In Simmons, a deed of trust was recorded
incorrectly describing the east half of the northeast quarter as one half of the
northeart quarter. Upon foreclosure, a trustee's deed was executed and recorded
containing the identical description error. The former mortgagor then conveyed to a
third party who claimed bona fide purchaser status due to the descriptive errors of
the previous instruments. Id.
49. 81 Miss. 351, 356, 33 So. 21, 22 (1902). Accord Pan Am. Life Ins. Co. v.
Crymes, 169 Miss. 701, 153 So. 803 (1934).
50. 225 Miss. 291, 83 So. 2d 185, modfied, 225 Miss. 302, 83 So. 2d 763 (1955).
51. Id. See Dead River Fishing & Hunting Club v. Stovall, 147 Miss. 385, 113 So.
336 (1927). See, e.g., Bowen v. Thornton, 227 Miss. 562, 86 So. 2d 505 (1956); Adams v.
Hill, 208 Miss. 341, 44 So. 2d 457 (1950); Deason v. Taylor, 53 Miss. 697 (1896).
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creditors and subsequent purchasers with constructive notice of its
existence, notwithstanding an error in its description, whenever it is
apparent what the error is and the description is such as reasonably
to enable creditors and subsequent purchasers to find the land.u
Although the Burkett holding does not state explicitly
that deeds of trust are within an ordinary purchaser's chain
of title, the implications are clearly there.53 Constructive no-
tice by recitals is therefore governed by the probability of
discovering the error from the contents of the instrument
viewed as a whole.
ANALYSIS BY THE COURT
It is apparent from the Florida Gas decision that the su-
preme court gave its imprimatur to the lower court's finding
of mutual mistake despite evidence suggesting that Thomp-
son may have been prompted to admit the mistake under
tainted circumstances. Undoubtedly, Thompson's conduct
subsequent to the execution of the 1952 deed was, at the
least, ambivalent. Nevertheless, once the finding of mutual
mistake became final, the Duhig rule was sure to receive a
diluted application. Contrary to precedent, the supreme court
stated that the McLeod deed had only the "apparent effect"
of conveying a three-fourths mineral interest.54 Numerous
cases preceding Florida Gas took a firm view that the deed
conveys what it does not properly except. 5 Therefore, the
Florida Gas decision has forged an inroad on the Duhig rule
to the extent that a title examination is no longer a purely
objective matter. To be sure, the prudent course of action
would require going beyond the records when the deed re-
serves minerals without mention of prior severances. More-
over, recitals in deeds of trust will constitute constructive no-
52. 225 Miss. 291, 298, 83 So. 2d 185, 188 (1955), modiied, 225 Miss. 302, 83 So. 2d
763 (1955).
53. Contra Barksdale v. Learnard, 112 Miss. 861, 73 So. 736 (1917). The court
held that recorded deeds of trust reciting that the mortgagor was a widower were
not constructive notice to the mortgagor's subsequent purchaser that an equitable
interest was outstanding. The basis for the holding was that the deeds of trust were
not in the purchaser's chain of title. Id.
54. Searcy v. Tomlinson Ints., Inc., 358 So. 2d 373, 374 (Miss. 1978), ,ff'd sub
nomr, Florida Gas Expl. Co. v. Searcy, 385 So. 2d 1293 (Miss. 1980) (emphasis added).
55. See, eg., Lucas v. Thompson, 240 Miss. 767, 128 So. 2d 874 (1961); Brannon v.
Varnado, 234 Miss. 466, 106 So. 2d 386 (1958).
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tice, whether the instruments are essential in deraigning ti-
tle or not.
Even though mutual mistake is shown, for reformation
to affect third party purchasers, notice must be established.
The purchaser with notice stands in no better position than
the parties themselves so far as reformation is concerned. 6
In addressing this issue the court cited Russell v. Scarbor-
ough5 for authority that recitals may constitute notice and
remove the barrier to reformation as against third party
purchasers.58 It remained a question of fact as to whether no-
tice could be imputed to Florida Gas as third party purchas-
ers. In reasoning this issue, the court found evidence of no-
tice in both verbal and documentary form.59
DOCUMENTARY NOTICE
In Florida Gas the deed of trust recitals were held to
give constructive notice that McLeod intended to reserve one-
fourth the minerals unto himself. Since Thompson executed
the deed of trust it could be inferred that he neither claimed
the interest for himself nor denied McLeod's right to the
same. The court was unpersuaded by the appellant's argu-
ment that the deed of trust was not within the chain of title,
and therefore incapable of giving notice to the purchaser of a
lease. It appears that the court viewed the recitals as practi-
cally tantamount to an admission on Thompson's part.
In a deed of trust, the recited encumbrances on title are
often given without a previous attempt to weigh and inter-
pret the validity of the individual encumbrances or reserva-
tions. In fact, there may be circumstances where the object is
to take maximum protection by reciting in the instrument
whatever appears of record in the nature of an encumbrance
on the title. There is no danger in over-reciting because the
56. See Russell v. Scarborough, 155 Miss. 508, 124 So. 648 (1929). In this case,
the purchasers argued that while the original parties or their heirs are perfectly
free to reform as between themselves, the rule is not unimpeachable. A purchaser
for value without notice, actual or constructive, precludes reformation. The court
agreed with these precepts but found notice was imparted through possession of the
land under claim of title, and a recital in the deed description to a recorded plat
bearing the owner's name. Id. at 511, 124 So. at 649.
57. 155 Miss. 508, 124 So. 648 (1929).
58. Id.
59. 385 So. 2d at 1297.
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primary role of the deed of trust is that of a security instru-
ment. Although the circumstances in Florida Gas lend cre-
dence to this alternative as a reasonable interpretation of the
recitals, the court's interpretation was substantially rein-
forced by Thompson's later written admission of mutual mis-
take. It would seem that the recitals were given a retroactive
interpretation in light of the later admission executed for a
paid consideration. Additional support for the court's inter-
pretation of the recitals came from the fact that the deed of
trust was uncancelled when Florida Gas made its lease pur-
chase. 0 Furthermore, the Burke t 1 decision negated the ap-
pellant's chain of title contention. The Burkett case, though
factually distinct from Florida Gas, implies that a deed of
trust on the property is within any purchaser's chain of title.
It is clear, however, that the purchasers in Burkett were de-
raigning title directly through the deed of trust in question.
If there is reason to distinguish which instruments are capa-
ble of giving notice on the basis of the deraignment of title,
the Florida Gas court did not indicate what rule would pre-
vail. Burkett reaffirmed the notice rule as stated in the Dead
River case.62
As compared to other jurisdictions, it appears that re-
citals are a potent means of imparting notice under the Dead
River rule. Not only recitals derived from searching the
chain of title, but also recitals contained in any previous deed
or conveyance by the grantor have the potential of giving no-
tice. 3 A literal reading of the second half of the Dead River
rule makes the boundaries of the purchaser's search limit-
less. The rule states that the grantor's previous deeds and
conveyances must be examined if they "in any way affect" 6'
the purchaser's title. Taken literally, this statement would
subsume and make unnecessary the chain of title search out-
lined in the first half of the Dead River rule. How is the pur-
chaser to know if the instrument affects the title "in any
way" unless he has already seen it? Therefore, all the gran-
60. 1& at 1296.
61. 225 Miss. 291, 83 So. 2d 185 (1955), modjfled, 225 Miss. 302, 83 So. 2d 763
(1955).
62. 147 Miss. 385, 113 So. 336 (1927).
63. See genera/y 1 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 13.6
(1962).
64. 147 Miss. 385, 395-96, 113 So. 336, 338 (1927) (emphasis added).
19811
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW
tor's deeds and conveyances are subject to the purchaser's
duty of search. Since Thompson's deed of trust would easily
fit into either the Burkett rule on chain of title, or the catch-
all provision of the Dead River rule, the court had ample au-
thority for holding the recitals gave notice to Florida Gas.
Even more important, under the latter rule, the recitals cre-
ated a duty of inquiry which would be treated as if it were
fully pursued when determining what knowledge is imput-
able.65 The duty of inquiry arises only if the recitals are suffi-
cient to raise a question in the mind of a prudent purchaser.
Sufficiency is, of course, a question open to many interpreta-
tions. Is the recital sufficient if it says that A reserved min-
erals in a certain instrument and the truth of that statement
is immediately negated by settled case law? Or, is it merely
that the duty of inquiry has been invoked, and at once put to
an end by a rule of law? The supreme court again relied upon
the Burkett decision when it addressed the issue of sufficien-
cy. Burkett held that a recital is sufficient to raise an inquiry
in a case of misdescribed land if the property could still be
located from the information given."6 It may be that the "in-
formation given" includes an additional recital to another in-
strument that does accurately describe the property, even
though it cannot be located from the contents of the immedi-
ate instrument. Thus, there are recitals within recitals. On
the other hand, the recital may be so poignant that it gives
notice of an ultimate fact without the necessity of inquiry.
Under the Burkett facts, the deed of trust stated outright
that it was subject to two specific prior deeds of trust. Both
were recorded but contained misdescriptions. This was held
to constitute notice of the ultimate facts, and no inquiry was
necessary. In parallel reasoning, the Florida Gas court said
that Thompson's deed of trust "recited that McLeod owned
an undivided one-fourth interest" in the minerals. 7 Without
expressly saying so, it would appear that the court had rea-
soned that this recital was one of ultimate fact. The problem
in accepting this premise is that the "ultimate fact" was ulti-
mately null and void by force of the existing law. The pur-
65. Id.
66. 225 Miss. 291, 299, 83 So. 2d 185, 188 (1955), modired 225 Miss. 302, 83 So. 2d
763 (1955).
67. 385 So. 2d at 1296 (Miss. 1980).
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chaser who knows and applies the law as it stands should be
on equal dignity with the purchaser who conducted an inqui-
ry through other means.
VERBAL NOTICE
Similar to the duty of inquiry raised by recitals, a pur-
chaser may be given a duty to inquire because of something
said in the course of the transaction.8 Again, the sufficiency
of the statements determines the imposition of the duty. In
applying this rule to the case at hand, the supreme court
held that Thompson had told Banahan in 1957 that he be-
lieved he owned only one-fourth of the minerals. Applying
the holding in Sun Oil Co. v. Broadhead,69 the court reasoned
that a duty of inquiry arose from Thompson's statements.
Sun Oil held that an inquiry will arise if anything comes to
the attention of the purchaser such as to "put a prudent per-
son acting in good faith on inquiry."70 The landowner in Sun
Oil had told the purchaser that he believed that he had al-
ready leased the property under inquiry. This was sufficient
to require a record examination to determine if the tract was
leased.71 Of course, Banahan made multiple record examina-
tions, but a crucial link in the court's reasoning is missing in
Florida Gas. Banahan was not an agent of or even known by
Florida Gas.72 Florida Gas, having appeared on the scene in
1971 to purchase a lease from Thompson, could not possibly
have known what transpired between Thompson and a third-
party lease buyer in 1957.
This note has previously alluded to the uniqueness of
the Florida Gas case. The doctrine of mutual mistake and the
Duhig rule are not likely to arise in the same context of
facts. This was explained by showing that third party trans-
feror of the grantee takes the place of the party who would,
under circumstances absent mutual mistake, assert the Du-
hig rule against the grantor. But the case is not so unique
68. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Broadhead, 323 So. 2d 95 (Miss. 1975); Smalley v.
Rogers, 232 Miss. 705, 100 So. 2d 118 (1958).
69. 323 So. 2d 95 (Miss. 1975).
70. Id. at 98 (quoting Beauchamp v. McLauchlin, 200 Miss. 83, 94, 25 So. 2d 771,
775 (1946)).
71. Id. at 99.
72. See supra note 3 and accompanying text
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that it defies comparison. Miles v. Martin73 is based upon
facts that are essentially synonymous with Florida Gas. In
Miles, just as in the present case, due to mutual mistake, a
warranty deed failed to properly except a prior reservation.
The grantor attempted to reserve one-fourth of the minerals
without mentioning a prior one-fourth mineral severance."'
The grantees, who would be in Thompson's place in the Flor-
ida Gas case, executed a deed of trust that recited the gran-
tor's reservation.75 The deed of trust was placed of record,
and the grantees transferred an interest to third parties. Al-
though the property was sold rather than leased to the third
party transferees, their position would be equated to that of
Florida Gas in the principal case. The deed given to the third
parties contained a blanket exception of prior mineral reser-
vations but reserved no additional minerals to the transfer-
or.76 The original grantor filed an action to construe the deed
to accurately reflect a one-fourth mineral reservation unto
himself. The issue, inter alia, was whether the deed of trust
recitals were as a matter of law constructive notice to the
third party purchasers. In other words, did the Duhig rule
apply to cut-off reformation? On these facts, the Miles and
Florida Gas cases stand virtually the same. However, unlike
the supreme court's interpretation in Florida Gas, the major-
ity in Miles found that the Duhig rule resulted in the gran-
tor's deed conveying three-fourths of the minerals.7 The case
was remanded with an indication from the majority that
equitable relief might be granted in an action to reform, if
mutual mistake were proved. The Miles court's treatment of
the deed of trust recitals is particularly interesting in com-
73. 159 Tex. 336, 321 S.W.2d 62 (1959).
74. Both reservations were of one-fourth mineral interests, less the leasing
rights. For convenience, they are referred to herein simply as one-fourth mineral
reservations. Id. at 339, 321 S.W. 2d at 64.
75. The deed of trust recited that it was "subject to mineral interest reserved in
deed from L. A. Wall and wife to J. 0. Martin dated December 22,1950, recorded in
Volume 417, page 600, Deed Records of said [Taylor] County, and to mineral interest
reserved in deed from J. 0. Martin and wife to Jabe M. Pratt and Carl P. Pratt
dated January 12, 1951." Id at 340, 321 S.W. 2d at 65.
76. The conveyance was "made subject to any outstanding mineral or royalty
interest now owned of record by persons who are not parties to this conveyance." Id
at 344, 321 S.W.2d at 68.
77. Technically speaking, the warranty deed conveyed three fourths of the bo-
nus money, rentals and all leasing privileges, in addition to the entire surface rights.
I at 339, 321 S.W.2d at 64.
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parison to that of the Florida Gas decision. The majority felt
that the deed of trust did not attempt to evaluate, define, or
assess the "legal consequences" of the recited reservations,
but was designed to subordinate the trustee's rights to what-
ever interests were reserved by the terms of the respective
deeds.78 The majority further reasoned that the recitals
might be relevant to establish mutual mistake in an action to
reform, although as against a bona fide purchaser reforma-
tion would not lie.
The notice rule under Texas law is substantially limited
in scope as compared to the Mississippi rule. As the majority
pointed out in Miles, the purchaser is charged with notice of
"only the facts actually exhibited," and not what "might
have been ascertained by such inquiries as an examination of
the record would have induced a prudent man to make."79
The majority applied this rule and deduced that since the re-
citals did not disclose mutual mistake, they were not as a
matter of law constructive notice to the purchaser. 0 On the
other hand, the majority indicated that if the purchasers had
actually seen the recitals, a duty to inquire may have aris-
en."' On remand this would be an issue for the jury to decide.
A dissenting opinion in Miles took the position that the
deed of trust recitals were notice of the mistake. The dissent
reasoned that notice was apparent because the purchaser's
own deed contained an assumption of indebtedness clause
and reference to the deed of trust. The purchasers assumed
this indebtedness.2 It was therefore incumbent upon them to
pursue such inquiry regarding the recitals as a reasonably
prudent person would have made. The blanket reservation
contained in the deed to the purchaser, excepting any out-
standing reservations, further supported a finding that no-
tice was given. 3 However, for the notice to affect the pur-
chasers rights, and consequently lessen the impact of the Du-
hig rule, it would be necessary to prove that the inquiry
would have led to actual knowledge of the true state of af-
78. Id. at 342, 321 S.W.2d at 67. See supra note 74 for the terms of the reserva-
tion.
79. Id, at 344, 321 S.W.2d at 68.
80. Id. at 345, 321 S.W.2d at 69.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 346, 321 S.W.2d at 70.
83. Id. at 347, 321 S.W.2d at 71.
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fairs. The reasoning of the dissent is akin to that of the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court in Smalley v. Rogers.14 In both cases
the presence of a blanket reservation, purportedly excepting
all prior reservations, served as a way around the Duhig rule.
CONCLUSION
In effect, the Florida Gas decision creates an exception
to the Duhig rule based on the doctrine of mutual mistake.
The exception would apparently arise only in transactions in-
volving three parties as it is inconceivable that the Duhig
rule would ever be in issue as between two parties who ac-
knowledge mutual mistake. For the grantor to avoid the
harshness of the Duhig rule, it must be shown that the third
party had either actual or constructive notice. Under Missis-
sippi's rule, it is unnecessary to show notice of the mistake
itself, because a duty of inqury may arise through the doc-
trine of constructive notice. The recorded recitals, whether
seen or not, create the inquiry which in turn imputes notice
of all matters discoverable. A more expansive rule of notice
would be difficult to imagine. From a practical perspective,
Florida Gas has directly affected the role of the title examin-
er. Whether the object of the examination is merely a lease
or an in-depth title deraignment, the Duhig rule is no longer
an all purpose curative tool. The purchaser cannot rely on
the Duhig rule to the exclusion of all other interpretations
that the records may suggest. Of course, the real question is
when do the records adequately suggest another interpreta-
tion? The inroad on the Duhig rule made by Florida Gas has
the potential of becoming over-inclusive. For example, it
seems that a grantor's reservation reading: "I, John Jones,
hereby reserve unto myself one-fourth of the minerals," is on
its face indicative that the reservation is for the grantor per-
sonally. Yet in the past a nominative reservation of this sort
has been executed by the Duhig rule on the same basis as a
non-specific reservation reading: "the grantor reserves unto
himself. ... " Because the Duhig rule has been based on the
force and effect of warranty, specificity was considered im-
material. With the advent of Florida Gas, it would appear
that constructive notice of mutual mistake could just as easi-
84. 232 Miss. 705, 100 So. 2d 118 (1958).
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ly arise from the nominative reservation as from a collateral
instrument recital. When the constructive notice rule is
broad in scope, as is Mississippi's, the purchaser will be less
able to employ the Duhig rule to defeat the true intent of the
parties. Some jurists never accepted the rule as legitimate in
the first place for the reason that it undermines the intent of
the parties.85 Others have quarreled with the rule in that it in
effect operates to unjustifiably strike out parts of the grant-
or's instrument.86 Undoubtedly, the Duhig rule can yield
harsh results with the mere slip of a pen. On the other hand,
fairness alone has never been a sound basis for settling a
controversy that has practical implications beyond the rights
of the immediate parties.
Derek A. Wyatt
85. See Salmen Brick & Lumber Co. v. Williams, 210 Miss. 560, 50 So.2d 130
(1951) (Alexander, J., dissenting).
86. See Fatheree v. McCormick, 199 Miss. 248, 24 So.2d 724 (1946) (Griffith, J.,
dissenting).
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